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In the 21st century, there has been a significant rise in dependency on the Internet for
daily activities. Web applications such as online banking, web-based emails, social
networking, and many more services have become an instant means of communication.
These web applications and the data to which they have access are often targeted using
malicious attacks, including SQL (Structured Query Language) Injection Attacks (from
now on referenced as SQLIAs), which may cause serious damage. In particular, attackers
use SQLIAs to target interactive web applications that incorporate database services. In a
SQLIA, an attacker can insert malicious SQL code as an input to perform unauthorized
database operations, which could potentially jeopardize the privacy, integrity and security
of the users.
This thesis proposes an unconventional hardware-based approach for solving SQL
vulnerabilities and thwarting SQLIAs. Specifically, we are approaching the problem of
SQL Injection by using an FPGA to search for action-based binding keywords which join
multiple queries. These keywords form an integral part of any attack query. We search
for these keywords in a user’s input space and replace them with a null string. By doing
so, the binding query is nullified, and the attacking query is rendered harmless.
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION

Global development relies on insights and advancements in technology. As “The Stone
Age did not end for lack of stones, and Oil Age will end long before the world runs out of
oil.” (said by Sheikh Zaki Yamani in the Economist edition of October 2003) [1], [53].
Today, we live in what many call the Information Age, and we are absolutely in no
danger of running out of information. There is a general perception that we are
overwhelmed with data, making the ability to store, process, analyze, consume, secure
and act upon data as a primary concern. For large scale, multi-national organizations,
such as the finance industry, or the health industry, the situation has become very
complex and challenging. The question then becomes, how do we process and store this
large amount of data while maintaining its secrecy, reliability, and availability.
In many cases, big data is stored for efficient access by creating relations in data
and then storing them into database, which is then called relational database. These
databases are accessed for data via websites and APIs (Application Program Interface)
through a language called Structured Query Language (SQL). Many of these websites are
vulnerable to hackers seeking to perform attacks because backdoors are left open by poor
coding practices that do not adhere to good security standards. Hackers unleash hordes of
bots to look for sites that have these coding weaknesses[42]. In some cases, specific
websites may be targeted due to the value of the data a hacker hopes to access. In both
cases, trusting designers to simply write good code has proven to be an inadequate
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response, and no perfect protection system exists. It has become crucial to address this
issue and to counteract the attacker’s creative steps for hacking into systems.

1.1 Input Vulnerability-Based Exploits
Many of the vulnerabilities in web applications take advantage of the ability of the hacker
to access that application as a user or potential user. Thus, the data entered by the user
becomes a vector into the system that can be used to carry out a desired exploit. The
number, diversity, and complexity of these web based exploits have been gradually
increasing ever since they came in to existence. Here we present some examples of such
exploits:
•

SQL Injection: SQL injection is a subset of code injection attack [54]. The

attacker embeds a piece of code in a computer program via user input/data entry.
Execution of the infected program provides the attacker with improper access to the
computer program or application. Although web-based applications are developed to
achieve desirable access to the database by authorized users, the attacker uses them to his
benefit to gain access to confidential information stored in the database. In this thesis,
SQL Injection Attacks will be abbreviated as SQLIA.
•

Cross Site Scripting: Cross Site scripting (XSS) is a code injection attack where

malicious code is injected in the website and is executed in a browser. The attacker inserts
a script in the victim’s browser, and when the compromised website is accessed, the script
then executes on the victim’s computer. Through XSS, the attacker can control browser of
the attacked entity remotely. It is a way of bypassing the Standard Operating Procedure
(SOP) concept. For example, whenever HTML code is generated dynamically, and the
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user input is not sanitized and is reflected on the page, an attacker could insert his own
HTML code in that page [45].
•

Cross Site Request Forgery: This is an attack in which the attacker deceives the

user into executing actions that are helpful to the attacker while accessing a web
application. A CSRF vulnerability allows an attacker to force the user to perform
activities that the attacker wants to carry out, when the user is logged into a website. For
example, a perpetrator may forge a request for transferring fund to a website.
The above-mentioned vulnerabilities are all instances of input-based vulnerabilities.
There are many other Web-attack vulnerabilities such as buffer errors, path traversal,
code injection etc., but they don’t necessarily depend on user’s input for the victim’s
exploitation.
The relative prevalence of some of these attacks is shown in the figure below. This data
was obtained from HACKING & TRICKS, a blog about Hacking &Computer Security by
Nirav Desai, in an entry from January 8th, 2013 [2]. Clearly, SQL Injection comprises a
significant fraction (approximately 25%) of all web-based attacks.

Web-Attack Vulnerability Report
4%

2%

SQL injection

8%

Cross site scripting

25%

Buffer errors
Path traversal

14%

Code Injection
Cross site request forgery

17%

3%

Authentication & authorization
Web browser

7%
8%

information leakage

12%

web server

Figure 1.1 Web-attack Vulnerability Report [2].
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1.2 Motivation of the Thesis
The prevalence of SQLIAs and the potential damage that they can cause, including
identity theft and the extraction of financial data, requires good solutions to address these
exploits. The applications affected by SQLIAs is constantly increasing, and history has
shown that depending on website and application developers to write perfect code that
adequately checks user input is an inadequate solution. Alternative approaches are needed
to help protect these databases.
The basic intention of this thesis is to design a solution for preventing SQLIA where the
solution does not depend on good coding practices. In addition, the method should
provide good performance. Although checking of user input for correctness and safety
has previously been proposed, such approaches may take a significant number of clock
cycles and require the programmer to implement them correctly. In this research, we
explore the potential implementation of alternative checker for user input in dedicated
hardware instead of software. Specifically, we implemented a string search and replace
method in hardware with the goal of removing one of the primary vectors of SQLIA
attacks. The strings to be matched in SQL statements are the action-based binding
keywords necessary for joining attacking parameters to a query in a SQL statement. The
use of an FPGA (Field-Programmable Gate Array) for this checking allows multiple
characters and keywords to be checked simultaneously in parallel. When a keyword is
found, it is removed from the user’s input and replaced by null characters. Thus, only
sanitized user input may be seen by the system. By replacing these keywords with nulls,
we achieve a very good secured database system, which is immune to SQLIAs that
depend on those keywords.
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1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review the basic
concepts of SQL and investigate various factors leading to SQLIAs. In particular, we try
to answer why SQLIAs occur and describe the exploits in a web application that an
attacker uses to cause a SQLIA. In Chapter 3, we describe work done previously on the
prevention of SQLIAs. In Chapter 4, we describe, our proposed method for preventing
SQLIAs. In Chapter 5, we describe implementation of our design and evaluate the
performance of our design when implemented in software and hardware. Furthermore, we
compare the performance of our design in hardware to other previously applied solutions
in hardware. Finally, we conclude our thesis in Chapter 6, and lay our plans for future
work on this project.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND

2.1 Definitions for SQL and related terms
SQL (pronounced as “sequel” and an abbreviation for “Structured Query Language”) is a
high-level language [55], the basis of which is heavily dependent upon relational algebra
and relational Calculus. SQL is made up of declarative elements such as queries,
expressions, clauses, statements, etc. It is widely known for being a powerful query
language. The basic difference between a query language (QL) and a programming
language (PL) is that QLs are not expected to be Turing complete, they are not expected
to be used for complex calculations, and they have a very good efficiency for handling
large data sets [46].
Implementation of a query language is based on the relational algebra (operational part)
and the relational calculus (declarative part) [3]. Relational Algebra refers to a
specification of a sequence of operations for performing a particular request, whereas
relational calculus refers to the specification of a required output without any information
about the sequence of operation required to process a request [47].
Table 1 lists a few examples of Relational Math Operators that are used in the
development of a query statement.

6

Table 1 Table Relational Match Operator [3].
(σ) Selection

Selects a subset of rows from a table.

(π) Projection

Deletes attributes from tables which is not present in relation
list.

(X) Cross product

Allows combinations of relational search.

(-) Set difference

Defines mutually exclusive relations.

(U) Union

Defines mutual dependability of relations.

Additional operators, such as intersection, join, division, and renaming are useful as well.
To summarize SQL, it’s a relational model that is defined rigorously with simplicity and
the power of operational algebra to efficiently carry out all the database related tasks with
the best possible optimization. As a result, SQL is the lingua franca for accessing
database systems.
After looking at SQL definitions and related terms, we consider the underlying method
for processing on the web and discuss the architecture required for processing SQL. We
describe the processing of a web application with the following sequence:
1.

When a client (typical web user’s internet connected device) enters a web address

in a web browser application, the sever (computer that stores webpages, sites, or apps)
sends a copy of a form to the client.
2.

Users of the web browser enter data in this form and submit it to the server.

3.

The server runs the script for the form and when it determines it is appropriate

gives the client access to the underlying application or database.
The architecture required for processing a web application is as shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1 A canonical web architecture [4].

The web architecture is broadly classified into three tiers of processing. The web browser
in Figure 2.1 represents the Presentation Tier. The Web Server, Application Server, and
File System make up the Server Tier. Finally, the Data represents the Database Tier of a
web application system. Functions of each of these tiers are described in [48] and
summarized below.
1. Presentation Tier: holds the conversation with the users for the system. It deals with the
user’s input, the response from the system, and is the face of the web service for the user.
2. Server Tier: is the backbone of the entire database systems as it encapsulates the logic
required for the database to work.
3. Database Tier: is the storage point where all the data are stored.
Security measures could be implemented at the Presentation Tier (the application), or at
the Server Tier (server space), or at the Database Tier (physical database location).
Protective measures which could be applied to web applications could include software
patches on data acquisition processes at the Presentation Tier, data encryption at the
Database Tier.

However, in many cases security measures at the Server Tier of a web

application system are especially appropriate for preventing various types of attacks.
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2.2 SQL Injection Attack (SQLIA)
A SQL injection attack is a type of code injection attack. This exploit is carried out by
adding SQL code in the user’s input to gain access to unauthorized resources. SQLIAs
may occur when the query is built by concatenating the user’s input, such as data entered
into a web form, with unintended data, including URL (Uniform Resource Locator) data,
data obtained from cookies etc., without proper validation. The contributors to Rain
Forest Puppy, a black-hat community website, were the first ones to ever publish
information about SQLIAs in their paper “NT Web Technology Vulnerabilities” [5]. SQL
injection is one of the favorite attacks for many cybercriminals because it can be executed
remotely, and the attack surface is obvious. Commercially available vulnerability
detection tools are accessible to attackers as well, and with help of these resources, the
attacker could find loopholes in a security system and web vulnerabilities in a mere
fraction of a second. SQL is a very flexible language, and these attacks can be extremely
stealthy and could pass through firewalls and intrusion prevention systems very with little
effort [59].
Figure 2.2 shows a well-known cartoon illustrating of the effects of SQLIAs. As we can,
see when Robert’); DROP TABLE students; _ _ was inserted in the school’s database, all
the entries of the students for that year were lost. This is a humorous example that shows
how SQLIAs can be caused by inserting particular phrases in a SQL query. (In this
example, the child just happens to be named with a SQL expression that caused the
deletion of the database.) In general, such entries would not be normal, but would be
entered maliciously by an attacker to perform a similarly problematic function. The
possibilities of exploitation using SQLIAs are great and a significant number of security
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enterprises and websites report on these exploits to create awareness among people about
threats due to SQL injection attacks.

Figure 2.2 SQL injection Bobby drop tables [6]

According to the 2016 Vulnerability Statistics Report [43], by edgescan, 82% of
vulnerability factors arise from the application layer of the network, which is a high-risk
target. With respect to databases up to 95% of the critical risk factors were found in the
web application layer. Examples of SQLIAs consist of the 2011 hack of the security firm
HB Gray Federal, which allowed attackers to steal passwords for company’s corporate
emails and more than 60,000 emails were exposed online [43]. A SQL Injection attack
vector was used in hacking the Chinese toy company VTE, in which the information of
around 4.9 million people was stolen [7]. The famous Albert Gonzalez attack, including
the hacking of 7-Eleven, Hannaford Brothers, and Heartland payment systems included
SQL injection as the active attack vector [7]. The ease with which a SQL attack can be
conducted and the extent of damage that it causes makes SQL Injection a preferable
choice for hackers. Defense against SQLIAs requires knowing how these vulnerabilities
prevail in the system and how they are taken advantage of by hackers to gain profit.
For a SQLIA to affect a system, the attacker needs to know about the injectable
parameters of the system (i.e. he needs to reconnoiter the vulnerabilities present in the
10

web application and look for the injectable location for forming an attack which would
yield the most promise). The attacker must then formulate an attack that is stealthy
enough to avoid detection from firewalls and protection systems. He must then garner as
much data as he can from the affected system so that he can make the most of victim’s
data. SQLIAs are caused mainly due to the lack syntax constraints of some programming
languages and poor programming practices. Four different categories of SQLIA vectors
are described in [8] and summarized below:
1. SQL manipulation: In this attack, the clause following the “where” clause is
manipulated to produce behavior not expected by the database programmer (e.g.
supplying the where clause with a union statement can provide access to data for which
the user should not have access.)
2. Code injection: In this attack, a new SQL statement is concatenated to the previously
present SQL statement (e.g. appending an execute statement at the end of a general
statement.) A limitation of this kind of SQLIA is that the database must support multiple
SQL statements per query.
3.Function call injection: This is the secondary injection attack wherein the attacker uses
the inbuilt functions of the database to cause an SQLIA that manipulates the data
according to the needs of the attacker.
4. Buffer overflow attack: In this case, the data entered as input would heavily exceed the
memory bounds of the planned storage space. It would overwrite the data pointers and
could also be used to point towards an executable causing the system to execute any file
of the attacker’s intent.
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In this thesis, we attempt to prevent SQL injection attacks related to the first three
categories. We do not address buffer overflow.
2.3 SQL Processing Overview
SQL processing happens in three main phases [9]:
1.

Parse

2.

Execute

3.

Fetch

Parsing phase: Parsing, is the first stage in processing a query which checks for syntax
and semantic validity of the query statement by tokenizing the query statements. For
parsing a sentence, to make it a meaningful query, the sentence needs to be analyzed
lexically, syntactically, and semantically.
Execution phase: The query execution phase starts with query optimization. Optimization
consists of generating an appropriate sequence in which the logical process of query
execution proceeds and is mapped to physical resources. Specifically, optimization
generates an execution plan that is selected to increase performance and reduce the use of
server resources [60]. The cost factor for the execution plan depends upon physical
resources such as I/O, CPU, memory, the number of records the engine would need to
process, etc. The actual execution starts with the optimized plan and executes the mapped
physical instructions;
Fetch phase: This is the phase where the rows of the results to the query are obtained and
made accessible to the end users. The execution phase determines what data must be
extracted for the query and the fetch phase retrieves that data. The data can then operated
12

on by the execution engine before being sent back to the client. Now let us consider an
example of a SQL injection attack and see how SQLIAs can occur with small changes in
user input data.

2.4 SQL injection attack shopping cart example
A typical web application consists of a client-side codebase and a server-side codebase
executing on the client’s web browser and the web server respectively. The client-side
code interacts with the users and supplies user inputs to the server-side code. The serverside code computes the operations based upon these inputs to provide appropriate
services. Figure 2.3 shows a shopping cart example where the user has already filled the
cart with the products that he or she wishes to purchase. The checkout form asks for the
payment information and the delivery information from the user.
Considering that the backend database is parameterized, this example would construct an
insert query, for appending the user’s input to the ‘orders’ table. Consider the user giving
following inputs:

Qty1=1, Qty2=1, Qty3=1, card = “xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8739”, name = “Nancy”,
address = “ABC street, #123, Texas-72771, USA” operation= “purchase”

13

Figure 2.3 SQLIA shopping cart example [10].

Let us assume that the total purchase is of $130. The query generated for this set of inputs
will be
INSERT INTO ORDERS (‘ps’, ’bj’, ’hs’)
VALUES (‘Nancy’, ‘130’, ‘xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8739’, ‘ABC street, #123, Texas-72771,
USA’)

When the above query is executed, a record of purchase is updated to the Orders table.
Now consider, a malicious attacker who wants to supply as input the address = “ABC
street, #123, Texas-72771, USA’; DROP TABLE Orders; --”.
The query generated for this set of input will be
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INSERT INTO ORDERS (‘ps’, ’bj’, ’hs’)

,

VALUES (‘Nancy’, ‘130’, ‘xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8739’, ‘ABC street, #123, Texas-72771
USA’);
DROP TABLE Orders; --)

As we can see, the address parameter is followed by the delimiter placed after the original
address input. In addition, the delimiter is followed by an attack sequence, which drops
the table. Another thing to notice here is that the attacker would not be charged any
money because of the following hyphen, which is another delimiter used for commenting
out the string present after it. Hence, the system doesn’t get any purchase confirmation,
but the result of this query is that the Orders table is deleted from HAUTELOOK’s
database. To further analyze SQL injection attacks, we need to explore the techniques that
attackers use to cause SQL injection.

2.4 Mechanisms used for causing SQLIA
As previously noted, we consider SQLIAs that are caused by code injection, SQL
manipulation, and function call injection in this thesis. There are two ways of injecting
malicious data in a database
1.

Data manipulation through the user’s input

2.

Data injection by seeding an indirect trigger

Data manipulation using user’s input: In this attack, the attacking parameters are inserted
in the input that is taken from the user (i.e. the attacker injects malicious code by
masquerading as the user’s input deep inside the SQL query); this makes it difficult for
the SQL Data Base Management System (DBMS) to prevent illegal access to the
database.
15

The authors of [44] classify SQL injection attacks implemented through user input data as
belonging to one of five categories: tautologies, logically incorrect queries, union based
queries, piggy backed queries, and alternate encoding. The details of these types of
attacks and the ways in which can be executed are discussed below:
i)

Tautologies: The attack location for a tautology is in an input field or URL that is

vulnerable and openly exploitable. This type of attack requires a conditional statement to
execute successfully. There are many models of SQL injection attacks based on the “=”
operator, but many relational operators such as “<”, “>”, “<=”, “>=” also relate to a result
in a true or a false fashion. Possible goals of an attacker in a tautology attack include
identifying injectable parameters, bypassing authentication, and extracting data.

For

example, tautologies can be used for causing more advanced attacks, such as changing the
admin passwords without checking for the old password [44], as shown in the following
query:
UPDATE users SET password= ‘I got u’ WHERE Username= “admin” ‘_ _’
AND password = ‘1=1’

In this example, the tautology arises from the entry of ‘1=1’ in the password field.
Because this statement is always interpreted as true by SQL, the system will execute the
command to change the password without the attacker needing to know the previous
password.
Tables 2 and 3 provide two more examples of tautology attacks: one for a user input box
and one for a URL. In both cases, a legitimate query, SQL injection affected modified
query, and the result obtained due to the execution of modified query are listed.
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Table 2 Tautology attack using input box [41]
Example

1>0 is always true

Point of insertion

Input box

Normal Query

SELECT * FROM Customers
WHERE Country='Germany' AND City='Berlin';

Modified query

SELECT * FROM Customers
WHERE Country='Germany' AND 1>0;

Result comparison

Normal query displays just one element of the table Customers
(the one who lives in Berlin) but the modified query gives data
for 91 customers—all the customers in Germany.

Table 3 Tautology attack using URL [41]
Example

https://www.xyz.org/index.aspx?id==3343’ or બે= બે;

Point of insertion

URL

Normal Query

SELECT *from users
WHERE ccnum=xxxxxxxxxxxx9875

Modified query

SELECT * from users
WHERE ccnum=xxxxxxxxxxxx9875 or બે= બે;

Result comparison

Normal query displays just one element of the table users, but
the modified query results in all entries of data from the table
users

ii)

Logically incorrect queries: These attacks are a type of brute-force technique used

for obtaining information about the backend system. They form a major part of a standard
reconnaissance effort. The performance of this type of attack depends upon the number of
requests required to perform the data extraction process and the time that is required to
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gather enough data to enable the attacker to cause a successful attack [51]. Commonly
known injection vectors have a history of depending upon the Database structure and the
signature of the SQL Injection attacks to which the database is vulnerable. A few ways to
investigate the backend database of a system to fingerprint the vulnerability list include:
a)

Unique error based vulnerability detection: This type of attack occurs when an

attacker deliberately writes an illogical query and waits for the system to generate an error
message. Table 4 lists an example of input data provided by an attacker in the URL of
website where he tries to use the keyword near with the wrong syntax. A legitimate
query, the SQL injection affected modified query, and the result obtained due to
execution of the modified query are shown below. The response to the modified query
provides information regarding the version of the backend SQL database.

Such

information is useful to an attacker in carrying out subsequent attacks.
Table 4 Error based illogical Query attack.
Example

http://example/index.php?near id=1'

Point of insertion URL
Normal Query

SELECT * FROM users
WHERE id = ‘1’

Modified query

SELECT * FROM users
WHERE id = ‘1’’

Result

You have an invalid query, please check the manual for mssql version
5.2

The success of this kind of attack depends upon the error messages displayed by the
database.
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b)

DBMS Function Invoking: In this attack, the inbuilt debugging functions are used

by the attacker to obtain information regarding the database’s backend. For example, the
easiest and most accurate way to identify which database is used is to ask the database to
identify itself. This would require the attacker to possess good union attack skills. The
DBMS querying functions such as @@version or version () are functions which would
provide information about the underlying software used for the system configuration.
Because the configuration details of SQL are well documented and standardized, such
functions will be known to an attacker a priori. Figure 2.5 displays use of the inbuilt
DBMS function @@version for inferring the backend database.

Figure 2.4 DBMS Function invoking attack [11]
c)

Fingerprinting using Inference Attack: Here the attacker submits a SQL statement

that is only valid for one DBMS. If the injected statement is correctly executed, the
attacker can conclude that he has discovered which database is being used. There are also
many other ways of using logically incorrect queries to help cause a SQL injection that
will provide confidential information about the underlying database system.

iii)

Union query: Union is a reserved keyword used in all database development

languages, including SQL, to query the database for the union of two data entities (i.e. it
is a relation that includes all the tuples that are either in the first or in the second tuple or
in both the tuples, without including the duplicates in the tuples, where the tuple is a set of
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data.) For the union attack to work, both the tuples must be compatible (i.e. both must
have the same number of tuples and the domain of each attribute in column order should
be same in both the tuples). Generally, a union attack is caused by specifying a union of
the original query and a second query with the same structure. For example, an original
query for usernames could be “unioned” with an additional query for credit card
information. This type of query attack requires a good amount of reconnaissance. Figure
2.5 is a snapshot of a terminal window where a union query attack is carried out. The
original query was intended to provide price data related to category 1. However, the
prices of all entities in categories A and B are displayed as well by using the UNION
SELECT statement in the SQL query.

Figure 2.5 Union attack [11]

In general, union attacks happen in two steps. The first step is to gather information about
the database by crafting a valid SELECT statement. The second step is to retrieve any
information available, taking care that the injected query follows the structure established
during reconnaissance. If the security of the system doesn’t allow for error reporting, then
causing a Union query based SQL injection would become difficult but still be possible.
iv)

Piggy backed query: Piggybacking is a method of collecting statistics by

requesting some additional retrievals during the processing of a user query. Piggy backed
attacks are used by attackers to extract data, modify data, perform denial of service,
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and/or execute remote commands [44], by adding extra statements to an existing
statement. The attacker retains the original query but includes new queries that piggyback on the original query [63]. As a result, the DBMS receives multiple SQL queries.
The first query executes normally whereas the queries following the original query carry
out the attacker’s chosen logic in the database. This kind of attack requires the use of
delimiters to join multiple queries together. For example, the delimiter “;” could be used
for causing a piggy backed SQLIA. Scanning for SQL piggybacking in a network using
an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is difficult because such delimiters can be used in
valid code traveling through the network. This type of attack has a dependency on the
database configuration because it cannot be executed if the configuration of the DBMS
doesn’t allow multiple SQL statements in a single string. Table 5 lists an example of such
an attack where the “;drop table users - -“ is the piggy backed query.

Table 5 Example of a piggy backed SQL injection attack
Example

’; drop table users - -

Point of insertion

Users input field

Normal Query

SELECT * FROM users
WHERE username= ‘strange’ AND passwd= ‘12345’

Modified query

SELECT * FROM users
WHERE username= ‘strange’ AND passwd= ‘12345’; drop table users
–'

Result

Successful execution of dropping of table users.

Alternate encoding: This is an attack that tries to bypass protection systems by
representing the user data in a different language that the attacker hopes will be ultimately
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decoded by the DBMS. For example, SQL servers currently support six alternate
encoding schemes such as char, ASCII, Unicode, nchar, convert and cast. The
effectiveness of SQLIA using alternate encoding depends upon the efficiency of the
attacker in masking the attack sequence to make it look like a simple SQL query.
Table 6 SQLIA by using alternate encoding
Example

Hex (6e 69 73 68 61 72 67 20 6f 72 20 31 3d 31 2d 2d)

Point of insertion

URL

Normal Query

SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'John’ and pass= ‘*****’;

Modified query

SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = nisharg or 1=1 _ _ and
pass= ‘’;

Result

The user gets data for all the users in the database

Table 6 shows an example of the user’s input being provided in URL of a website where
the attacker tries to evade detection by encoding the input in hexadecimal. It shows the
mapping of the user input to a legitimate query and the SQL injection affected modified
query along with the result obtained due to execution of the modified query. In this case,
the result displays data for all the users in the database.

In addition to the user input data attacks shown above, indirect attacks are also possible:
Data injection by seeding an indirect trigger: In this attack, the malicious code is the
SQL statements injected into persistent storage (such as a table record) [56]. The table
record is considered a trusted source, but it could indirectly trigger an attack contents
maliciously inserted in the table are used later [53]. To make use of this kind of
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vulnerability, it is necessary to submit suitable data in one location, and then use some
other application’s function to process the data in the attacker’s intended way.
A basic scenario for an attacker to cause a second order SQLIA would be to ascertain a
web application that stores usernames alongside other session information. He would use
a cookie to trace a username from the system as reconnaissance for an attacking
parameter to be used later. Then he would use a Union statement and an update patch for
updating the users profile. Here the attacker can plant any primary form of query casting
bug and then leave the system as bait for vulnerable users to trigger the input function.
When another user triggers the attack embedded within the system, the attacker would be
informed and provided information from the backend database. For example, the attacker
can create a certain function in the definition of the system such that this vulnerability,
when used by any user, would cause a SQLIA.
Figure 2.6 shows the SQL injection process for causing an indirect trigger to the seeded
data. The attacker is seeding the session id data to update the user profile and after doing
so, he uses an ‘or’ condition to get the social security number for Jane.
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Figure 2.6 A second order SQLIA

Secondary injection attacks are difficult and time consuming to use for exploiting a
system because they require significant reconnaissance and must be crafted carefully.
However, the outcome of a secondary injection attack, if carried out successfully, is often
far more fruitful for the attacker than first order attacks.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE SURVEY

Since SQL works across multiple database platforms, and is designed to allow people to
access information, it is inherently vulnerable. Due to lack of sufficient resources, and
knowledge about attacker’s intentions, some companies incorporate security in the source
code of web applications. Such implementation of security in the system itself is called
defensive coding. One way of achieving protection against SQLIA is by not allowing
risky searching variables in search box, but providing users with predefined search inputs
for querying database, but this limits the right of users to use application.
We think that data is the primary target for SQLIAs, and protecting data is important. We
start by a simple thought process of obfuscating any means of accessing data illegally. To
support our thought process, for preventing SQLIAs, [12] & [13] proposes a runtime
approach for preventing SQLIA by comparing the cryptographic hash of user input
submitted dynamically with hash value stored in the database at the time of account
creation. If an attacker tries to insert malicious data in user input field, the hash function
won’t match. A similar approach of hashing user’s credentials is proposed in [14] & [15],
but the authors here, go a little bit further and encrypt the data provided by the users, the
hash function works on encrypted data. Since hash methods are difficult to reverse, it
successfully prevents some form of SQL injection attacks, but the overhead for
calculating hash values for inputs is high, and the users must wait for hash process to
complete to access the database.
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To overcome these limitations of SQLIA prevention methods, authors of [16] came up
with a novel approach of SQL instruction set randomization. They inserted random
variations in the SQL instruction set. When the user input triggers generation of a SQL
statements, these random SQL instructions replace normal query instructions and a query
is generated. At the time of execution, these random instructions are derandomized for
processing by database engine. Any malicious data, will not get parsed by the system and
will make no sense in the query statement, due to randomization. Cryptographic hash
functions and randomization process creates a huge overhead on the system. Using
encryption to achieve SQLIA prevention, consumes much more time and resources in
general because it costs database engine an average of 2.5 time’s normal processing time
[17]. Due to the above-mentioned limitations, we thought of exploring techniques which
prevent SQLIAs by taking previous attack scenarios into consideration and develop
secured system for processing SQL.
An alternative approach for preventing SQLIAs using signature or pattern of attack was
explored. In [18], the author describes a method in which three special files are a created,
these files contain definition and rule sets for matching user generated queries for
detecting and preventing SQLIAs. The files in this approach consist of definition of all
legitimate queries, definition of illegitimate queries and formats and syntax of all possible
dynamic queries respectively. When a query is generated using user’s input, this query is
intercepted by the script and it converts query to an Extensible Markup Language (XML).
This XML data is then compared against the special files. If the XML data matches the
legitimate query file, then it is send for execution to the database engine, otherwise the
file is checked for syntactic match, if it exceeds the threshold limit set by the authors, then
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it is considered legitimate query otherwise it is discarded. On similar concepts, authors of
[19] & [20] propose a pattern matching algorithm where the service provider creates a
database of known attacks and compares the user generated queries with it to generate an
anomaly. Rejection of query execution depends upon the match ratio of the user
generated query, If the query match totally, its execution is rejected. If the anomaly
matches partially, then that user query is sent to administrator for SQLIA inspection.
Drawback for this method is that to avoid false positives, partially matched queries must
be inspected manually, and anomaly detection library has to be entered manually.
Another approach described building static models of legitimate queries using parse trees.
These parse trees are stored in memory as tokens of data, when a user generated query is
provided to the design, the parse trees are compared to match for structure, if all the
tokens match, the query is allowed to execute on the database engine, otherwise it is
rejected ([21]- [23]). A similar approach was used in [24] & [29] where the query model
is created with grammatical syntax of legitimate queries and attribute values of
grammatical construct of a legitimate SQL statement respectively. These authors also
accounted for nested query checking by checking for each condition on the stacked query,
so that it matched with grammatical syntax of each separately defined query in the
statically defined model. They labelled any query which did not abide by the syntactic
rules in their library model to be an injection attack. This approach, left a loop hole in
security aspect, which was that the attacker could fingerprint the database. ([25]- [27])
overcome the limitations of [24] by using stored procedure mechanism, where strict
functional definitions of queries are made, and the users are expected to use just the
legitimate functions defined in the library of stored functions to query the database.
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Authors in [28], create a model by using lexical analysis of the queries generated. The
user generated queries are tokenized based on lexical analysis and total number of tokens
in the generated query are calculated and compared with a threshold for stored values of
token values. If the token values exceed a threshold, the statement is considered
malicious. This method assumes that an attacking query has an extra logic in the SQL
statement.
Authors of [29] proposed a mutation based SQL injection vulnerability detection
approach to prevent SQLIAs. They named a tool based on mutation based testing as
MUSIC, and created a set of 9 rules which they called as mutants. When an application
was tested, one mutant was inserted in the SQL query for testing vulnerabilities in the
application. These mutants are like test vectors, If the test vector executes successfully,
that means mutant has been killed and signifies an open vulnerability in the system.
Mutation based testing is a static approach, which is used for testing vulnerabilities in the
applications.
Since attackers are becoming smart every day, security measures have to be updated and
made smart enough to accommodate all possibilities of SQLIAs. In [30] & [31], authors
proposed to use Bayesian algorithm to detect and prevent SQL injection attack. A web
monitor intercepts SQL query, inserted by users and breaks it into number of keywords to
calculate the length of dynamic SQL query. It also calculates the number of keywords
present in that query after doing so, it makes use of machine learning for classifying the
obtained data. The classifier, calculates the probability of SQL injection in the query, and
then compares the probability of SQL injection calculated, with one defined by user
threshold as training data. If probability of user generated SQL query calculated by
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classifier matches the probability of legitimate query compute in training dataset, the
query is allowed; otherwise it is blocked. The training data set for machine can also
accommodate Blind SLQIAs. Based on same concept, authors in [32], create a training
dataset by analyzing the source code of the application to calculate entropy of static SQL
query. Entropy calculation were made to get better result in comparison with probability
based systems such as [30] & [31]. Entropy is calculated for user input data and that is
then compared with the entropy of stored query data, a match factor decides whether the
query would get executed by the database engine or get rejected. A very good example of
machine learning detection for preventing SQLIAs is given in [33], where the authors use
Term Frequency–Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) method for calculating weights
of generated queries. They use Naïve-Bayes, k-Nearest Neighbor Algorithm and Support
Vector Learning (SVM) Algorithm to evaluate attack sequence. Their approach indicates
a high precision of about 99.16% detection rate for SQLIAs.
Some authors used tools such as Static Analysis Frame work for detecting SQL injection
Vulnerabilities (SAFELI), String constraint solver (SUSHI), Dynamic Candidate
Evaluations for Automatic Prevention of SQL Injection attacks (CANDID) in ([30][36]). All of the above-mentioned methods were implemented in software and gave good
performance, we also want to explore hardware solutions for preventing SQL Injection
Attacks. One possible solution which we felt was to create a different memory space for
user input data and software defined code i.e. to make a machine based on Harvard
architecture and process SQL on it. In [37], authors show that any kind of code injection
attack can be prevented by separating code and data memories. This method gives a
primary protection from any kind of code injection attacks since the architecture would
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not be able to support code as data or data as code, and hence the attacker cannot not
inject any data into the instruction memory and at the same time, he cannot execute
anything content in the data memory. To scale this concept to real-world example, the
authors in the paper [37] used inbuilt TLBs and page tables to achieve this goal of
creating a Harvard architecture on an x86 system. The memory accessed by CPU is
defined in pages and each page is cloned and then marked for CPU access and Data
access where only the code or the instructions gets fetched by the instruction pointer from
the page dedicated as the instruction page and similarly only the data processing such as
read and write operations happen in the cloned page; thus, defining a boundary between
data and code. A huge hurdle in applying this method to SQLIA prevention is that to
apply this method to SQL processing, entire SQL must be changed, and the functioning of
OS should be changed according to the defined process.
To get enhanced performance and security for securing database against SQLIAs, we will
explore an approach in hardware which would be implemented on FPGA. Decision for
using FPGA’s to implement a solution for preventing SQLIAs was made to take
advantage of reusability and extreme parallelism available in a Field Programmable Gate
Array. We discuss our approach for preventing SQL injection attacks in chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROPSOED HARDWARE-BASED SQLIA PREVENTION
APPROACH

Throughout this thesis, we have been trying to answer questions that would help us
understand the scenarios under which SQL injection attacks occur and that would and
help us create a good hardware-based solution for preventing SQLIAs. In particular, this
thesis has been focusing on answering two questions:
Research Question 1: What are some of the currently available options for securing a
database against SQLIAs?
Research Question 2: Can we take advantage of hardware solution for securing database
applications?
We answered first Research Question in the previous chapter, and are trying to begin
answering the second one in this chapter.
4.1 Binding Keywords Used for SQLIAs
To understand the definition of our system, we consider a form for generating a SQL
query as shown in Figure 4.1. The code shown in this figure is the backend programming
required for generating a web form and getting user input to form a query.
For example, if we provide “alice@bank.com” as the user name and the password as
“alice123”, Then the generated query would be
SELECT from users WHERE “username” =
“alice@bank.com” and “password” = “alice123”
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Next, let’s consider that the system is under attack and the attacker replaces the username
with “aha!! or 1>0” and the password with “alice OR 1=1”. According to [38], now the
generated query would look like:
SELECT from users WHERE “username” = “aha!! OR 1>0”
and “password” “alice OR 1=1”.

Figure 4.1 The sequence of work behind the web page form [38]
Note: The website [38] may be compromised. Use at your own risk.
A SQL parser would create a parse tree for the generated SQL statements. We have used
Lucid chart [57] to create a block diagram representation of the parse tree generated by
the SQLIA sequence generated for this query by [38]. The chart is shown in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2 Parse trees for malicious vs legitimate queries
Figure 4.2 shows parse tree comparison of a non-legitimate (left side) and a legitimate
(right side) query. For the legitimate query, the system checks for the username entered
by the user in its database, if it matches any information in the database, it asks for the
password for that entity in the database, if both the username and password checks out
with a data entry in the database, the user is given access to his bank account. In case of
the non-legitimate query, when the user gives “aha !! or 1=1” as input, the SQL parser
considers the word “or” as a SQL function ‘or’ and tokenizes aha!! and 1=1 as two
separate inputs for the where clause of username. Note that if the attacker doesn’t have
any information about a username in the database, and uses aha!!, this would likely not
match with any real user in the database, but 1=1 would generate a condition which
would match all the entries in the database. Thus, by doing this, the attacker has made a
query to all the entries in the database for the table ‘username.’ In the same way, the
attacker passes the authentication phase for password by using input “alice or 1=1” to
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cause a tautology attack. The final outcome for this attack is that the attacker gets access
to all the users of the bank and can make transactions from any one’s account, whose
information is stored in table ‘username.’ Taking this example, we decided to eliminate
the keywords that bind harmful data to a legitimate query entered by users, before it is
passed to the SQL database engine so that the malicious execution will not occur. We
aim to look for substrings that are known to be used to bind the normal query to injection
parameters/attack parameters. We will then constrain the entry of the user’s input to the
SQL engine by blocking the query structures that would allow the input substring to
change the syntactic structure of the query. We believe that by eliminating these binders
from the user’s input before the user data is seen by the database that we can prevent the
use of attacking parameters embedded into a SQL query for a SQLIA.
As an initial proof-of-concept of the keyword elimination approach, we carried out SQL
injection attacks on freely available SQL coding practice sites and experimented with our
concept of eliminating binders from user’s input. We observed that since the attacking
parameters cannot be embedded into the SQL query (because we find and remove them),
the parser does not recognize the following part of the query as a different input.
Therefore, it is unable to create different data entities and relate the attacking parameter in
relation to a good query.
For example, when an attacker puts “xyz or a=a” as an input, the parser checks
authentication for both xyz and a=a when the ‘or’ is allowed to remain in the statement.,
if any one of these two inputs is true, the statement gets authorized. However, if we find
and remove ‘or’ from the user’s input, then there is no way for joining the tautology
factor which in this case is “a=a” to xyz. So, the parser will look for an input “xyz 1=1” in
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the database to find a user with this name. As long as no such user exists, the attacker
will not obtain access to the database. By removing the binding keywords, the attacker’s
ability to compromise the system is drastically reduced. Although detecting and
eliminating such keywords may be done in software, in this thesis we aim to explore a
method of doing so in hardware so that we can take advantage of the inherent speed and
parallelism of such an approach. In the next section, we provide a high-level overview of
the proposed hardware design.

4.2 Substring Match and Replace
We implement behavioral coding in Verilog for designing a string-matching machine that
will be simulated using the Intel Altera Quartus 13.1 web edition. A high-level
description of the designed circuit is as follows:
•

The string matching machine loads a word of user input into one register, which is to
be checked for keywords.

•

The user data register is then compared against each keyword to check for a match.

•

The result of these comparison is used as a selection criterion for allowing the user’s
word to remain in the query (i.e. if it is not a prohibited keyword) or for replacing a
prohibited keyword that has been found in the user’s data with Nulls.
This design, when implemented on an FPGA, will have to be attached to front-end
servers, where the data from client end, first enters the server space, as shown in
Figure 4.3. By doing so, we restrict the entry of malicious data to the back-end servers
and database.
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Figure 4.3 System architecture for modified SQL processing system [39] modified by
adding the string searching hardware.
Implementation and detailed explanation of circuit design for the above-mentioned
approach is shown in chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
SQL INJECTION ATTACKS DETECTION AND
PREVENTION IMPLEMENTATION

5.1 Key word selection process
We practiced SQL injection attacks on code Hackthissite, bWAPP and code
bashing.com/sql-demo, which could be accessed online [40], to explore the effect of
binding keywords present in attacking queries (Note, these websites may be
compromised. Use at your own risk.) In a manner similar, to the example shown in
Figure 5.1, each of the potential keywords was tried and tested for to see if it was capable
of causing SQLIAs.

Figure 5.1 SQL reserved keywords testing [41].

More specifically, the database used in Figure 5.1 for investigating SQL injection attacks
had a total of 91 entries for customers, but only 1 entry for a customer belonging to city of
‘Berlin’. However, due to the SQL Injection Attack performed by querying “Berlin or
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1=1” in a field requesting “city,” we were able to extract data of all the customers in the
database. By experimenting with many such SQL queries on the above mentioned SQLIA
practicing website, we created a set of reserved keywords, that should be sanitized from
the user’s input. In Table 7, we describe the keywords that we found to cause SQL
Injection Attacks and specify the reason that these keywords create an opportunity for
attackers. Specifically, this table was generated by taking the list of 250 keywords found
in Reserved Keywords (Transact- SQL) documentation on Microsoft.com [62]. Each
keyword was simulated using SQLIA analysis websites, like the one shown above, for its
ability to perform an attack when present. (Note that even if such keywords were inserted
by a user accidentally instead of maliciously, they could cause serious problems. Thus,
removing them from user input is often appropriate even if no attack is intended. Also
note that cases where combinations of keywords must be present to perform an attack
were not included in this list.)
Table 7 Reserved keywords and function
and

and operator displays a record if all the conditions separated by and is true.

or

or operator displays a record if any of the conditions separated by or is true

between between operator selects values within a given range.
not

not operator displays a record if the condition(s) is not true

insert

insert statement is used to insert new records in a table.
set operations allow the results of multiple queries to be combined into a single

set

result set

delete

delete statement is used to delete existing records in a table.
like operator is used in a where clause to search for a specified pattern in a

like

column.
in operator allows you to specify multiple values in a where clause,the in

in

operator is a shorthand for multiple or conditions.
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join

a join clause is used to combine rows from two or more tables
union operator is used to combine the result-set of two or more select

union

statements.
the into creates a new table in the default filegroup and inserts the resulting rows

into

from the query into it

"--"

"--" is used to comment the preceding statements in a query

create

create is used to create new instances of data in a database

drop

drop statement is used to drop an existing sql database.

alter

alter statement is used to add, delete, or modify columns in an existing table.

add

add statement is used for entering new enteries into existing table.

";"

";" is used as a statement terminator

all

all operator returns true if all of the subquery values meet the condition.

"'"

"'" is a character delimiter in sql statement

any

any operator returns true if any of the subquery values meet the condition.

exists

exists operator is used to test for the existence of any record in a subquery.

some

compares a scalar value with a single-column set of values

as

it creates copies of the table present in database table.

kill

kill is used to kill a process

5.2 Keyword searching circuit design
To search for the keywords, in the query given by the user, each word is compared with
the stored keywords specified in Table 7. For this design, we assume that the user data
has been ‘pre-parsed’ so that only individual words are given to the FPGA. Furthermore,
we assume that none of the words given to the FPGA would exceed a length of 16 bytes
(16 characters) in length. Words that are less than 16 bytes in length are packed with 0s
to make a 16-byte word that will be compared to each of the stored keywords. In the
experiments performed in this paper, the data fed into the machine is manually formatted
to achieve these desired characteristics. Future work will explore whether and how the
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parsing and padding with zeroes can be efficiently incorporated into the FPGA design
itself.
Figure 5.2 shows a high-level block diagram of the components of the “string search and
replace” design. The operations which happen in the string search and replace circuitry,
shown in figure 5.2 are as follows:
1.

The machine takes in the user input data in increments of one word of 16 Bytes at

a time.
2.

The comparator block checks the data against 25 keywords for a match. The input

is checks each character with the corresponding keyword character simultaneously and
compares the input data to all keywords in parallel. An output “match signal” is produced
after user data is compared with all the 25 reserved keywords.
3.

This match signal is used as a trigger for the replacement circuit, which is a

multiplexer or a switch that switches to the secondary input on a match, and provides with
a null string to the output of the multiplexer instead of the original “forbidden” keyword if
a keyword match was found. This will have the effect of removing the keyword from the
user’s input. Otherwise, the original user’s input is simply passed to the output.
4.

The final product of this design is filtered data, which is free of any harmful

keywords.
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Figure 5.2 Block diagram for SQL string search.
Note that the keywords register is hardcoded with the set of 25 key words, and the user
input data inputs get new pre-parsed data from the user input space every clock cycle.
Figure 5.3 shows a technology mapping of the string search and replace circuitry created
using the Altera Quartus 13.1 Web Edition. A more detailed description of each of the
components follows.

Figure 5.3 Technology mapping for fixed keyword matcher
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Figure 5.4 Design for one-character comparison [61].
Figure 5.4 shows the design of discrete comparator for comparing one character. In this
figure, one character from the user’s input and one character from a keyword are
compared bitwise, and the resulting output we get is the answer for the match condition of
one byte of data. When 16 such comparators give the result for a match of each character,
we then ‘AND’ the results of all the outputs of the 1-character comparators, to get a final
answer for comparison of one word of 16 bytes. This is shown in Figure 5.5. To
compare all 25 keywords simultaneously, the circuitry in Figure 5.6 is replicated 25
times, and the results of these 25 keyword comparators are OR’ed together to get the final
match signal used to replace a problematic keyword with NULL characters.
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Figure 5.5 Design for one-word comparison

5.3 Implementation evaluation
The Verilog specified design was synthesized using the Altera Quartus II Design Suite for
programmable logic. We used synthesizable behavioral coding for designing the string
matching circuitry where the keyword comparison is carried out by the circuit.

Figure 5.6 Timing simulation on cyclone IV device for keyword matching

Figure 5.6 shows a subset of a set of waveforms for one verification test of the proposed
circuitry. The top waveform corresponds to the clock. The second waveform corresponds
to the user’s input. The third waveform corresponds to the output generated after
replacing a reserved keyword with nulls or the original input if no reserved keyword was
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found. The fourth waveform corresponds to the match signal, y, which is asserted if a
match with a reserved keyword has been detected.
When performing the simulation shown in Figure 5.6, the user input given was “nisharg
or 1=1”. We assume that this input string was pre-parsed into three distinct words: 1)
nisharg, 2) or, and 3) 1=1. In our test, a new “word” is placed on the “din” inputs on the
falling edge of each clock cycle. The match signal attains the correct value for that input
data and is used to select the correct filtered output. Both y and the filtered output are
registered outputs and are shown changing on the rising edge of the clock.
As we can see from Figure 5.7, the user input at 15ns contains the keyword ‘or’. This ‘or’
is found by the machine as is indicated by the raised output shown in y. Also note that the
“or” was replaced by null characters in the corresponding output string shown at dout.
Thus, the circuit was able to successfully filter out these keywords.
To verify the effects of removing the reserved keywords from user input on a SQL query,
we next consider a similar example input on the SQL practice site.
First, assume that the input entered by the attacker for the username is:
users = “Berlin or 1=1”
The generated query would be:
SELECT from users WHERE “users” = “Berlin or 1=1”
and the SQLIA would have been successful, but when the inputs are sanitized by the
machine, the input provided by attacker will be filtered and will become
Users = “Berlin 1=1”
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and the corresponding query would be
SELECT from users WHERE Users = “Berlin 1=1”
A screenshot from this experiment is shown in Figure 5.7

Figure 5.7 Testing the results of string search outputs on SQL practicing website.

Figure 5.7 shows that we have successfully evaded the SQLIA by removing SQL
reserved keywords form the user input. The top SQL statement, where the output has not
been filtered, provides access to all 91 records. This is highlighted in yellow. In contrast,
the same statement with the “or” keyword removed generates “no result” and does not
provide access to any record. This is highlighted in green.
The functionality of solution required for SQL injection prevention has been verified with
the above example and similar examples, and now we look at the performance aspect of
the design. For testing performance, we compare the throughput and the input data
accepted by the machine per clock cycle with previously applied methods in hardware.
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The performance comparison for our method with other previously applied methods is
shown in Table 8. The first entry in the table is of our approach for preventing SQLIAs
and the other entries are of previously applied string search circuit designs for intrusion
detection systems. Our approach provides a throughput of up to 12.8Gbps at a 100MHz
clock frequency. (Note that this throughput is calculated based upon an input of 16
characters, or 128 bits per clock. In many cases, the words being input are less than 16
characters long. Thus, an alternative metric could be 100 million words per second.)
This security system appears to be more efficient than some of the previous methods
because the search and replace method applied is simpler and more targeted and does not
have an exponentially increasing set of rules to check when evaluating the user inputs.
Furthermore, these other approaches evaluate all of the data coming into the network
instead of being targeted only for user data whose destination is the SQL server. We do
not include the extraction of this user data from the network as part of our overhead.

Table 8 Comparison of search algorithm performance with other methods implemented
previously
Description

Input

device

frequency

Throughput

Cyclone IV

100 MHz

12.8Gbps

VirtexE-1000

68 MHz

2.1Gbps

Altera EP20K

90 MHZ

2.8Gbps

Bits/clk
Discrete comparators

128

Gokhale et al. [23] 32
disc comparator
Cho et al. [14] disc 32
comparators
Baker e al [27] KMP

8

Vitex 2 pro-4

221 MHz

1.8Gbps

Franklin et el [28]

8

Vitex -1000

31 MHz

0.24Gbps
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4.4 SQL injection defense analysis in Software.
To compare the performance of the hardware string search method with a software based
approach, I replicated the functionality of the designed hardware in the high level
language C, by comparing the keyword pattern and the text, one character at a time using
the template provided in [59].
The algorithm implemented in C works as follows:

Figure 5.8 Flow chart for software implementation of string searching algorithm

Figure 5.8 shows a flow chart of the string match implementation in software. When a
user provides an input, it is compared with the keywords. Because we have 25 keywords
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to compare, we iterate the comparison process 25 times. We get the time of the day when
matching starts and when the match output is obtained. By subtracting the start time from
the end time, we obtain the total time required to search for the keywords in the user
input. For example, when ‘or 1=1’ was used as the data input, the time taken by the
computer to process this string and find the leading ‘or’ was 742.3727µs.
To account for the variance in time due to the OS’ Priority Scheduling policy on a
modern processor, we ran each experiment 10,000 times and averaged the result to obtain
a realistic estimate of the expected time. This experiment was performed on an Intel i56500HQ running at 2.3GHz. We show the result of our comparison for several different
user data entry strings in Figure 5.9. This figure depicts the result of experiment
conducted on software and hardware implementation of the string search algorithm. The
y-axis is plotted with a logarithmic scale to fit the performance measure of both the
software and hardware implementation on one graph.
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Comaparison of approaches
1000

Time to process in μs

742.3727

728.2246

750.5672

731.8022

741.7375

100
10
1
0.1

nisharg or 1=1 x;drop tables
abc
0.05
0.03

0.01

insert into
members
0.03

abcd union
ccnumbers
0.03

O'Brian Lee

0.02

User input
Software approach

Hardwrae approach

Figure 5.9 Comparison of the designed approach in software and hardware

When the same input strings are applied to both software application and hardware
application of the proposed string search method, the time taken by the software approach
exceeds that of hardware implementation approximately by a factor of 104 . Note that the
time allotted to the hardware approach corresponds to one clock cycle per word. The
main reason for the performance gain in the hardware approach over software is due to
massive parallel searching of input data for a match against the key word rules. As an
additional advantage, the resources of the server would be free for utilization elsewhere.
(Note that we also implemented C code that used the strcmp function. The results for
finding a match with a keyword were generally greater than or equal to the data shown in
Figure 5.9.)
The FPGA utilization of the current design is very small. Only approximately 2% of the
system resources on the Cyclone IV device were needed. This is encouraging because it
indicates that a significant amount of additional functionality may be included in the
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FPGA, allowing it to be used for meeting additional security, repair, test, or performance
enhancement goals.
4.5 Limitations of SQLIA prevention using the string search and replace method
As seen in this chapter, we implemented a string search and replace machine in hardware
for detecting and preventing SQLIAs. Although operation of this method is quite fast, it
has some limitations. Most importantly, because we are removing the SQL reserved
keywords from the user’s input, legitimate users cannot take advantage of the functions of
the reserved SQL keywords for querying database. This could potentially be handled
through the use of pull-down menus or other data entry options that would allow such
keywords only in restricted circumstances. In addition, database inference attacks by
using logically incorrect queries are only partially prevented. Because error messages are
used for debugging the database, they are not prevented from occurring, but any
information gained about the backend database, will be less useful to an attacker because
binding factors are sanitized. The current version of the proposed solution also does not
implement the parsing of user data into words. Ideally, this portion of the work would be
capable of being done quickly in the FPGA as well. Finally, this solution is customized
for a specific database system, i.e. MySQL, but it can be applied to other database
systems as well by tweaking the keywords for a particular database system.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK

5.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we implemented a hardware design mechanism for SQL injection detection
and prevention. We began by investigating the characteristics of SQL, SQL injection, and
how they relate to the underlying structure of web-based systems. We also discussed SQL
processing and identified one of the most vulnerable parts of SQL processing to be the
“parsing process” where maliciously inserted keywords may be used to change user data
input from standalone data to executable code by binding malicious queries to legitimate
queries. This technique can be harnessed to provide unauthorized access and control to a
database. Thus, we identified the removal of such keywords from the user input stream as
a possible means of preventing such attacks.
Although checking of the user data for appropriate form and content has previously been
proposed and implemented in software, such approaches have proven to be inadequate.
Human error and sometimes a lack of safe coding knowledge still leave databases
susceptible to SQL injection attacks.
Thus, we designed a solution for preventing SQLIA without depending on the good
coding practices of the database software engineer. Instead, we propose implementing
the search and replace functionality in hardware on an FPGA. The proposed solution is
capable of performing comparisons of multiple binding keywords to the user’s input data
in parallel, significantly increasing performance. Furthermore, the FPGA-based filter
should be placed in the system such that user data cannot even reach the servers
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performing the processing until it has been checked and sanitized. The FPGA resources
required for mapping this solution to hardware included 271 out of 109424 Logical
Elements on a Cyclone IV GX: EP4CGX110DF3117 device. Our evaluation showed that
when we clock the hardware to a speed of 100 MHz, the machine can evaluate and filter
up to 12.8Gb of data per second with a single instance of the design.
We also verified that the proposed removal of chosen keywords and replacement of those
keywords with spaces was able to defeat traditional SQL injection attacks. Unfortunately.
while there are multiple advantages to implementing a solution in hardware, such an
implementation also comes with increased costs in the system and the need to change
some of the underlying structure of the system itself.

5.2 Future Work

Future work will investigate the use of alternative designs and implementations for
preventing SQLIAs without depending on the software designer to maintain good coding
practices. One could also implement various software searching algorithms in hardware
to see if there is a certain algorithm that gives a better performance and throughput in
comparison with the current implementation. One could also explore applying intelligent
context language semantics and machine learning techniques, to make the thwarting
process smart, so that the design knows or can predict the context in which the data is
used.
Other future work will explore adding functionality to the current hardware design. For
example, the current design depends on the input data to be presented to the FPGA in a
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word-by-word fashion. In the future, one could automate this process by designing a
circuit, to match for end-of-statement character in the user memory, to check for different
user inputs, and tokenize them in words.
Other future work will further investigate how the FPGA should be inserted efficiently
into a database system and how that database system will most efficiently communicate
with the FPGA. Finally, other software based coding approaches are possible, and we
will compare our method with other software coding algorithms.

Those that are

particularly efficient may become even more efficient when implemented well in
hardware.
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Appendix A

CONCEPT OF MEMORY OPERATION FOR STRING MATCHING

always @(posedge clk)
begin
for (innerloop_count=0;
innerloop_count<key_depth;innerloop_count=innerloop_count+1)
begin
for
(outerloop_count=0;outerloop_count<memory_depth;outerloop_count=outerloop_count+
1)
begin
addr = (innerloop_count*memory_depth)+outerloop_count;
match[addr] = memory_0[innerloop_count]== memory_1[outerloop_count];// match is
given a result of matching both the memory locations exhaustively
if(memory_0[innerloop_count]== memory_1[outerloop_count])
begin
newmem[addr] = 128'b0;
end
else
begin
newmem[addr] = memory_1[outerloop_count];
end
//memory_2[outerloop_count] = memory_2[outerloop_count] &
newmem[(outerloop_count*memory_depth)+innerloop_count];
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end
end
for (outer_replication=0;outer_replication<
memory_depth;outer_replication=outer_replication+1)
begin
for (inner_replication=0;inner_replication< key_depth;
inner_replication=inner_replication+1)
begin
memory_2[outer_replication] = memory_2[outer_replication] &
newmem[outer_replication+(memory_depth*inner_replication)];
end
end
match_acquired = & match;
$display("The memory is :%p",memory_2);
$writememb("output.txt",memory_2);
$writememb("newmemory.txt",newmem);
end
Example input file
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Figure A.1.1 snippet of formatted input data to the comparison machine

Figure A.1.2 Example data of keywords file

Figure A1.2 Example data of filtered output
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Appendix B
Software Implementation

Code for implementing software String searching in C

#include <sys/time.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
void search (char* pattern, char* text)
{
int M = strlen(pattern);
int N = strlen(text);

for (int i = 0; i <= N - M; i++) {
int j;

for (j = 0; j < M; j++)
if (text[i + j] != pattern[j])
break;
if (j == M)// if pattern[0...M-1] = text[i, i+1, ...i+M-1]
{
printf("Keyword *%s* found at index %d n\n\n",pat, i);
}
}
}
int main()
{
struct timeval start,end;
int i;
//printf("input the username/password:");
//scanf("%s",&txt);
char text[] = "O'Brian";
int pattern_length = 25;
double sum=0;
double temp=0;
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char pattern[25][10] =
{"and","or","between","not","insert","set","delete","like","in","join","union","into","-","create","drop","alter","add",";","all","'","any","exists","some","as","kill"};
int count=1000;
for(int j=0;j<count;)
{
gettimeofday(&start,NULL);
for(int i=0;i<pat_length;i++)
{
search(pat[i], txt);
}
gettimeofday(&end,NULL);
temp = (end.tv_sec * 1000000 + end.tv_usec) - (start.tv_sec * 1000000 +
start.tv_usec);
sum+=temp;
if(temp!=0)
{ j++;
printf("Iteration: %d, Time: %f\n",j,temp);
}
}
sum=sum/count;
printf("Average: %f",sum);
return 0;
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